The commit nobody can prove was theirs.
NIST SP 800-218, the Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF v1.1), defines PS.1.1 as the task of storing all forms of code, including source code, executable code, and configuration-as-code, based on the principle of least privilege, so only authorized personnel, tools, and services have access. NIST's own implementation examples for this task don't stop at access, though: version-control accountability for every change, commit signing, code-owner review, code signing of released executables, and cryptographic hashes to verify file integrity. This page covers that second half, the provenance and tamper side of PS.1.1 (the read-access side is covered under ISO 27001 A.8.4): not just who is allowed near the code, but whether you can prove a given version is the one that was actually reviewed, and who put it there.
That provenance usually breaks in configuration, not in a line of application code: a branch-protection setting, a release pipeline step, a build artifact's integrity check. A setting that is easy to loosen under pressure, a signing requirement a bot account cannot satisfy, an admin exemption that was supposed to be temporary, is exactly where PS.1.1 quietly weakens.
The shapes the same control failure takes.
PS.1.1 rarely breaks with a line that says 'disable protection'. It breaks when a provenance setting is loosened to unblock something else. The recurring shapes:
A signing requirement is dropped
Branch protection stops requiring commits to carry a verified signature, so a commit on the branch can no longer be tied to a specific, verified account.
Force pushes become allowed
A protected branch's force-push restriction is lifted, so history that was already reviewed can be rewritten or replaced without a trace of what it looked like before.
Admin accounts are exempted from the rule
A branch protection rule's admin-enforcement setting is turned off, so the accounts with the most access are the ones exempt from the rule meant to stop unilateral changes to history.
A release ships without its signature
A code-signing or artifact-signing step is dropped from the release pipeline, so a published executable's integrity can no longer be verified against its source.
A build artifact's integrity hash is dropped
A checksum or hash that lets a released file be verified against what was actually built is removed, so a swapped or altered artifact would reach its destination unnoticed.
A branch protection rule that stopped requiring signed commits.
A new automation account needs to push version-bump commits to main, and it cannot produce a GPG signature the way a person's local git config does. Rather than issue the automation account its own signing key, the branch protection rule's signed-commit requirement is removed for everyone who pushes to main.
resource "github_branch_protection" "main" { repository_id = github_repository.app.node_id pattern = "main"- require_signed_commits = true allows_force_pushes = false}This removes the one setting that tied every commit on main to a verified identity, for every account, to solve one account's problem. PS.1.1 lists commit signing among the implementation examples that keep code traceable to the account that changed it: once signing is no longer required, the commit history can still show an author name, but that name stops being verified against anything. Give the automation account its own signing key instead, and keep the requirement on the branch everyone else pushes to.
PS.1.1 is shown with signatures and settings, not a policy document.
SSDF is attested to, not certified, so a customer security questionnaire or an internal review asks for the evidence directly: is commit signing actually required on the branch releases come from, does the branch protection rule apply to admin accounts too, and does the release pipeline verify a signature or hash before it ships. The answer is a setting, not a sentence, and it is the kind of setting that gets turned off once to solve one account's problem and never turned back on.
A review, not your git hosting.
heygrc flags a change that weakens a repository's or pipeline's protection against tampering, such as a dropped signing requirement or a force-push exemption, and cites PS.1.1 so the setting gets scoped instead of removed outright. It does not manage your branch protection, verify commit signatures itself, or issue a provenance attestation. Available when NIST_800_218 is selected in org config.